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Victim Standing
Susan Bandes*
1. INTRODUCTION
Standing doctrine, firmly abetted by a host of overlapping jurisdictional
and substantive limitations like federalism, deference, separation of powers,
and prosecutorial discretion, poses some of the most difficult, if least publicly
visible, challenges to victim participation in the criminal justice process. This
specialized and confusing area ofjurisdiction erects formidable hurdles for
the crime victim, as well as for others concerned about inconsistent or
inadequate enforcement of the criminal laws. If the general notion of victims'
rights is widely accessible and hotly debated, the arcane procedural barriers
to those rights are inaccessible and little known.
Thus it is difficult to have a reasoned debate about victim standing
because of both the inaccessible nature of the procedural doctrines involved,
and the polarized character of the victims' rights debate in general. It is a
debate that lends itself too readily to sound bites, and in which there seems
very little genuine interchange. This is particularly unfortunate, because the
underlying substantive questions about victims' rights, while highly
emotional, are themselves far from simple.
In keeping with the above observation, my stance toward victims' legal
arguments is complicated. I have written in opposition to victim impact
statements and to the elevation of victims' interests to the status of constitu-
tional rights.' I have grave concerns about the threats these initiatives pose to
the rights of defendants, and to the ability of defendants to receive a fair trial
'Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I'd like to thank Robert Mosteller
for very helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper, all the panelists for a provocative
exchange of ideas, and Paul Cassell and the students of the Utah Law Review for their excellent
work in organizing this conference.
'See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 361, 365 (1996) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy] (arguing that "victim impact statements
are narratives that should be suppressed because they evoke emotions inappropriate in the
context of criminal sentencing"); Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously, the State's
Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1048-50 (1989) (criticizing use of victims'
rights by State, as representation of societal interests, to tilt balance of trial-related rights in
manner detrimental to individual rights).
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or a just sentence.- However, there is ample room to reform the treatment of
victims without diluting defendants' trial-related rights. The desire for
increased communication, for example, seems a matter of common sense and
common decency, and the argument against it seems to be merely avoidance
of administrative inconvenience? More controversially, victims are asking for
increased protection from crime (including notice when their violent attackers
are released) and for some ability to influence charging decisions. Many of
the arguments that are used to block these requests are too familiar to civil
rights advocates, and I have written critically of them They include: the
argument that the government has no constitutionally mandated affirmative
duties, not even the duty to provide adequate police protection; 5 the argument
that the citizen has no enforceable interest in seeing the government obey or
enforce its own laws;6 and a host of doctrines designed to insulate prosecuto-
21n addition, I have concerns about the effects of some proposals on victims
themselves-at least those victims who may not fit into certain preconceived stereotypes. See
Bandes. Empathy, supra note 1, at 405-08.
'See, e.g., Deborah Kelly, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in
VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 172, 173 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al.
eds.. 1990) (surveying administrative changes attempting to be more sensitive to concerns of
victims such as notifying victims of hearing schedules, establishing separate waiting rooms,
and training officers concerning special needs of rape victims). A notice requirement could, of
course, be made too onerous if it included notice of every motion. Moreover, a demand for
consultation during the trial raises problems that go beyond mere administrative inconvenience.
4See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271
passim (1990) [hereinafter Bandes, Negative Constitution] (criticizing idea of Constitution as
charter of negative liberties); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227 passim
(1990) [hereinafter Bandes, Idea of a Case] (criticizing Supreme Court's limitations on
justiciability based on its acceptance of private rights model).
5See, e.g.. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989) (holding that Constitution contains no affirmative governmental duty to protect);
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-85 (1980) (holding government not liable for harm
done by known dangerous criminal released from custody); Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714,
722-23 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding no liability when state officials released dangerous mental
patient they knew had threatened specific individual, without warning individual, leading to
her murder next day); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202-04 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding no constitutional right to police protection).
6See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that unwed mother had
no standing to challenge prosecutor's refusal to enforce child support laws against fathers of
illegitimate children). The narrow holding of Linda R.S. was that the plaintiff failed to establish
causation, since she could not demonstrate that prosecuting the father would lead to his paying
child support. See id. at 618. However, the case is also widely cited for its language indicating
that individuals have no cognizable interest in the government's enforcement of the law. See
id. at 619; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-55 (1984) (holding that parents of
black children attending public schools lacked standing to require IRS to adopt standards to
fulfill obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools).
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rial discretion from any substantive review,7 even when that discretion
arguably operates unconstitutionally to disadvantage women (as in domestic
violence cases),' minorities,9 or other marginalized groups.'0
Many of the most important reforms sought by victims' rights advocates
have been thwarted by the judicial construction of standing law and a host of
related doctrines designed to insulate government, and particularly prosecu-
tors, from any meaningful oversight or accountability. My thesis is that the
sorts of victim initiatives that have been successful have been those, and only
those, that advance the prosecution's own agenda," while preserving the
prosecution's complete freedom from third-party interference.' 2 To the extent
7See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (preventing most federal injunctions
against state prosecutions); Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (upholding idea of
absolute prosecutorial immunity); Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y.
1968) (recognizing idea of public duty doctrine, but holding that duty owed by government is
to public at large and is unenforceable by individual litigants).
sSee, e.g., Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 861 (holding city not liable to assault victim for failure to
provide protection). But see Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527-28 (D.
Conn. 1984) (finding that differential treatment of domestic violence cases violated equal
protection); Bandes, Negative Constitution, supra note 4, at 2328-30 (discussing evolution of
doctrine).
9See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-70 (1996) (rejecting selective
prosecution claims in absence of showing that similar conduct of other races has gone
unprosecuted); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-99 (1987) (finding insufficient link
between statistical evidence that death penalty is administered in racially discriminatory pattern
and litigant's individual case).
I"See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d
Cir. 1973) (holding that decision to investigate, arrest, and prosecute state officials for alleged
violation of prison inmates' federal civil rights was within discretion of United States
Attorney).
"This statement is, of course, an oversimplification to the extent it suggests a unitary
prosecution agenda. Undoubtedly there are differences among prosecutors and prosecutors'
associations regarding support for victims' rights. However, the National District Attorneys'
Association's resolution on the Federal Victims' Rights Amendment, which supports the
general idea of victims' rights, but urges that any federal amendment contain provisions that
prosecutorial discretion shall not be diminished at any stage, and that abridgement of victims'
rights shall not be a cause for liability or injunctive relief affecting the prosecutorial function,
is fairly representative of the attitudes that have been expressed. See Nat'l Dist. Attorneys'
Ass'n, Res. 97-01 (Mar. 9, 1997).
'
2See Robert Mosteller. Victims' Rights and the Constitution: Moving From Guarantee-
ing Participatory Rights to Benefitting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY's L.J. 1053, 1057-60
(1998) (giving examples of victims' rights that would have been enforceable against
government but have been eliminated from current version of proposed Federal Victims'
Rights Amendment). For example, the right to be reasonably protected from the accused has
been replaced with the right to have the safety of the victim taken into consideration in
determining the accused's release, so that no affirmative duty to protect could be ascribed to
the government. See id. The victim's right to be present has been replaced with a right not to
be excluded, since the former might require delay for purposes of victim attendance, or require
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victims seek their own standing to litigate or enforce interests that might
diverge from the prosecution's, they have been unsuccessful-ending up
instead mainly with unenforceable promises 3 and the opportunity to assist (or
some would say, be used by) the prosecution in attaining a harsh sentence. 4
My interest here is not necessarily in arguing for broader victim
standing. I do not support the notion of amending the Constitution to accord
rights to victims, and I have great concerns about the use of the victims'
rights mantle to dilute the constitutional rights of the accused. Victims,
nevertheless, have important interests that may be obtainable by other means.
The debate often seems to conflate a number of issues that need to be
considered separately, and that make an examination of victim standing
important. First, the abuse of prosecutorial discretion can reach constitutional
magnitude, to the extent it singles out protected groups like racial minorities
or women, and any discussion of standing must recognize the distinct issues
raised by such cases. Second, as I mentioned above, a number of reforms that
would be advantageous to victims would not conflict with the rights of the
accused.'" Finally, the assumptions underlying the denial of standing in many
of these cases are at best malleable and politically charged, at worst harmful
and wrongheaded-to victims, and to others as well. I will consider these
assumptions in the sections that follow.
the government to provide transportation to victims. See id. Most basically, the proposed
Victims' Rights Amendment specifically provides that the victim shall have no grounds to
challenge a charging decision or a conviction, to overturn a sentence or negotiated plea, to
obtain a stay of trial or compel a new trial. See id. It also provides that nothing therein shall
give rise to a claim for damages against the government. See S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. (1999).
3See Kelly, supra note 3, at 182 (discussing possible harmful psychological effect on
victims of receiving empty promises); see also United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325,
334-35 (10th Cir. 1997) (construing Victims' Bill of Rights as mandating only that
government make "best efforts" not to sequester relatives); A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 141 (1997) (statement of Paul Cassell) (explaining limitations in Victims' Bill of
Rights). The proposed Victims' Rights Amendment explicitly exempts government from
damage claims for failing to safeguard the proposed rights. See McVeigh, 106 F.3d at 335
(holding that, despite Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), victims have no standing to
challenge ruling that they cannot give victim impact statement if they attended trial); S.J. Res.
3, 106th Cong. (1999).
4See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson. The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937,
945-48 (1985) (arguing that victims' rights movement has been co-opted by crime control
model).
13See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitution: An
Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1698-1704 (1997)
(discussing shift in victims' rights movement from calling for greater participatory rights and
greater governmental protection, which do not disadvantage defense, to initiatives that directly
advantage prosecution, and conflict with rights of defendants).
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II. STANDING IN THE SHADOW OF THE GOVERNMENT
The concept of victim standing requires one to think about the questions
of who has an interest in a criminal trial, how that interest ought to be
defined, and precisely what interests any particular party ought to be able to
represent. This proves to be a rich and perplexing area of inquiry. To pursue
it requires delving into the assumptions that shape standing doctrine, as well
as the assumptions that shape the adversary system ofjustice.
Although standing doctrine raises difficult issues in the criminal context,
it is important to understand these issues in the larger context of public law
litigation. The government, of course, plays many roles in litigation, both as
criminal or civil plaintiff, and as defendant. Because the government is a vast
bureaucracy that plays numerous roles and takes complex series of actions
through numerous parties,'6 it is not always easy to determine what interests
and parties the government represents. If, for example, a citizens' watchdog
group believes that the governmental agency charged with environmental
protection is underenforcing the laws, or even enforcing them in a way that
conflicts with that group's interests, does the group have standing to
supplement or even challenge the government's enforcement? The usual
answer is that the government has the sole interest in enforcing the law, and
that it will be assumed to be representing even interest groups who claim their
interests are being ignored or misrepresented.' 7 Indeed the Court has shown
itself willing to hold that certain constitutional provisions will simply go
unenforced if the government chooses not to enforce them, since no
individual has standing to seek their enforcement. 8 Thus the Court holds, in
effect, that the interests asserted by the governmental agency are congruent
with the interests of society, or at least all those segments of society that have
a cognizable right to be heard in federal court. 9
6Consider for example the action challenged in Lqjan v. National Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871 (1990), in which a wildlife organization sought standing to challenge a regulation
issued by the departments of Interior and Commerce that limited the geographical scope within
which federal agencies were required to consult with the Secretary of the Interior before taking
actions that might jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species. See id. at 875-79.
7See Bandes, Idea of a Case, supra note 4, at 298 and cases cited in nn.487, 488; see
also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-55 (1984) (-Respondents here have no standing to
complain simply that their Government is violating the law.").
"
8See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222-23,
227-28 (1974) (holding that citizens and taxpayers could not challenge violations of
Constitution's Incompatability Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80
(1974) (holding that taxpayer lacked standing to challenge violations of Constitution's
requirement of regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money).
9See Bandes, Idea of a Case, supra note 4, at 299 (noting that Court consistently
recognizes unitary common good-one which is represented by government).
No. 2]
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When the government is being sued, the attitude of the Court tends to
change considerably. The Court's willingness to view the governmental
plaintiff as a collective entity capable of representing divergent interests
contrasts with its often very narrow view of government as defendant. Thus,
the government as victimizer is routinely portrayed as far less representative
or powerful than is government as protector of victims. The wrongdoing may
be portrayed as the act of a single employee rather than the government as a
whole,2" or as the fault of intervening private actors,- or as an isolated
instance unlikely to be repeated (at least with the particular plaintiff as the
victim). 22 Pragmatically, this insulation is accomplished through numerous
doctrinal means, including narrow constructions of municipal liability,
standing doctrine, and substantive constitutional law. In other words, when
the government is victimizer or wrongdoer, the societal interests in protection
from wrongdoing become much harder to enforce. Indeed, to the extent the
government routinely claims to represent the interests of victims and of
society, the very notion of being the victim of governmental wrongdoing
defies the paradigm.
In short, the courts tend to protect the interests of the government by
making it harder to challenge its authority as plaintiff, and harder to sue it as
defendant. The juxtaposition suggests that the judicial definition of
government--of whom it is composed, and what interests it represents-is
malleable and political. These characteristics can only be magnified in the
politically-charged field of criminal law.
III. VICTIM AND GOVERNMENT IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
To establish standing, at least under Article III, requires a demonstration
that one has a cognizable injury, caused by the defendant.24 Who has a
cognizable interest-that is, an interest the courts are willing to recog-
20See, e.g., St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 128-31 (1988) (holding retaliatory
firing to be fault of individual supervisor rather than governmental agency).
2 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Svcs.. 489 U.S. 189,
195-203 (1989) (finding government not liable for social worker's avoidable failure to protect
child from violent father, since father, not government, administered actual beating).
22See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 100-03 (1983) (denying injunctive relief
to plaintiff injured by application of police chokehold, for lack of real and immediate threat that
he would again be stopped and choked by officers).
2See, e.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 128-31 (applying narrow construction of municipal
liability to insulate much supervisory conduct); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981)
(applying narrow construction of due process clause to insulate conduct that is categorized as
unforeseeable); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975) (applying narrow construction
of standing doctrine to insulate local government).24See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-61 (1984).
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nize-in the criminal process? To answer this question even on the most
doctrinal level requires examining assumptions contained in both standing
doctrine and criminal law. The adversary system, in a criminal case, assumes
only two parties: the government and the defendant. If additional litigants,
such as victims,25 have a stake in this process, they have no independent
vehicle for asserting their interests, so they must rely on the prosecutor to
represent adequately their interests for them.26 It is often noted that in other
countries, victims do play an independent role in the process.27 But this
observation needs to be understood in its true comparative context: there are
basic structural differences between our criminal justice system and many of
those in which victims are accorded an independent role. This is not to
suggest that a larger role is impossible under our system, but rather that such
a role may not be so easily grafted onto our system as currently structured.
For example, Professors Pizzi and Perron's comparison of Germany's
system with that of the United States28 illustrates that the binary opposition
between accused and government, with no room for a third party, is not
inevitable, and that a criminal trial can, theoretically, accommodate the
participation of a victim. But Pizzi and Perron accompany this information
with an important observation. The ease with which third parties are included
in German criminal trials is in large part a function of the fact that German
trials are inquisitorial rather than adversarial-and thus much more amenable
to parties who do not fit neatly into either of the two adversary roles.29
Victims are encouraged to tell "the whole truth," which may lead to
testimony that, under U.S. law, might be excluded under evidentiary rules or
might not comport with the effects sought by the trial attorneys? Thus, in
Germany, the victim's participation is not necessarily congruent with the
interests of the prosecution.
2 Victims' rights advocates often use the term "victim" to include relatives of victims
who seek a role in the criminal process. I will adapt that usage here.
2 As I will discuss below, it is also possible that a third party may want to assert interests
on behalf of the defendant, as occurred with Gary Gilmore's mother. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429
U.S. 1012, 1014-17 (1976) (denying Gilmore's mother standing to challenge application of
death penalty to her son).
"See, e.g., Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: Opening the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COmP. L. 839, 841-45 (1997) (providing summary of victim participation in criminal
proceedings historically in various countries).
2See William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37 passim (1998)
(contrasting German criminal trials where judges examine all relevant evidence in case and play
central role in production and examination of witnesses).
29See id. at 43-44.
3 See id. at 37, 44-45.
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Thus, to determine what role victims can play in our system requires
deciding what societal role the system itself is supposed to play-and through
which parties. If the system is mainly concerned with finding the truth, as in
Germany, it will allow more narrative testimony, more illegally obtained
evidence, and perhaps more parties to participate-since it is not the clash of
opponents but the inclusion of several concerned viewpoints that is likely to
lead to truth.3' If the system seeks to achieve goals like equality of treatment,
due process, and judicial integrity, it may forego illegally obtained evidence,
exclude certain testimony though it is relevant, and ensure that prosecutorial
discretion meets certain criteria. That is, it may assume that not only an
aggressive prosecution, but also the protection of the defendant's rights,
serves the interests of society.32 If, however, the system is all about obtaining
convictions, then the prosecutor can more credibly claim to singlehandedly
represent the interests of society.33 Moreover, the victim's role will be limited
to actions that advance the prosecutor's goal. For example, the victim might
be encouraged to testify at sentencing, but only if the victim's testimony is
likely to sway the jury to vote for the death penalty or otherwise impose a
harsher sentence. Since the victim must be encouraged to come to hearings
when required to testify, a certain amount of communication with and even
concern for the victim is necessary to ensure her cooperation. But to the
extent the victim wants something different-a voice at sentencing though
she is not calling for the death penalty, or participation in the trial to assert
interests or tell stories that diverge from the prosecutor's-these goals will
not advance (and indeed may interfere with) the prosecution agenda, and thus
are not valued when conviction and harsh punishment are the highest goals. 34
31Akhil Amar is a recent and articulate proponent of the view that the trial should be
focused on separating the guilty from the innocent. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 155 (1997). But see Susan Bandes, "We the
People" and Our Enduring Values, 96 MICH. L. REv. 401 passim (1998) (reviewing Amar's
book and critiquing its central premise).
32See, e.g., Letter from Chris Whipple, Victims Services, to U.S. Sen. Orrin G. Hatch 2
(June 9, 1998) (on file with author) (opposing Victims' Rights Amendment). This letter states:
"All citizens, victims and defendants alike, have an abiding interest in the fairness of the
judicial system. The guarantee of individual rights is fundamental to our democratic process:
any compromise of fairness is no help to victims." Id.
33See Letter from William Murphy, National District Attorneys' Association, to U.S. Sen.
Patrick Leahy I (May 27. 1998) (on file with author) (opposing provision in proposed Victims'
Rights Amendment permitting prospective relief by victims). Mr. Murphy observes: "Our view
from the onset of this proposal is that a Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment, cannot
truly be of help to a victim if it, in any way, assists a criminal defendant in escaping justice."
Id. 34See Mosteller, supra note 12, at 1054 (discussing shift from participation model to
advantaging prosecution).
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To illustrate how and why standing doctrine generally disadvantages
victims unless their interests are congruent with the government, I will
examine two areas of the criminal justice system in which crime victims have
sought to carve out their own sphere of influence. First, I will examine the
role of the victim in setting punishment, in general and with some attention
to the issues of the death penalty and restitution. Second, I will examine the
role of the victim in situations in which the prosecutor fails to prosecute.
A. The Victim's Role at the Punishment Stage
In many states, the prosecution comes courtesy of "the people of the
state of X." The prosecutor is the people's representative, who is expected to
seek to obtain conviction only when conviction would be just, and to seek
only just punishment. The punishment for the justly convicted inures to the
good of the polity. This modern view contrasts with the feudal view of
punishment as an agreement between wrongdoer and victim?5 The state has
assumed monopoly power to keep the peace, and to do so through the use of
state-sanctioned force if necessary. The state's police power and the judicial
power enforcing it are deployed for society, not for any individual. For
standing purposes, I want to focus on two questions raised by this formula-
tion. The first question is: Who is injured by any particular sentence-one
that is either too harsh or too lenient? The second question is closely
connected to the first, but not necessarily the same question: Who ought to
have a voice in the sentencing process, or in post-sentence challenges?
Victims' rights advocates have been frustrated by the courts' attitude
toward restitution, for example. When restitution is awarded to a particular
victim, and then not paid, courts have held that the individual victim is not
harmed by the defendant's failure to pay. The harm inures to society as a
whole. This conclusion is based on the purposes restitution is said to advance,
which are penal and rehabilitative.3 ' That is, restitution helps society as a
whole by helping to right the damage to the body politic, and it helps the
33See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
92-99 (1980) (discussing traditional administration of early Anglo-Saxon law through blood
feud and lynching); Henderson, supra note 14, at 938-42 (comparing role of victim in English
law with modem American criminal law); see also Bandes, Empathy, supra note I, at 406-07
("Commentators have observed that the victims' rights movement revives the concept of
privatized justice by portraying the criminal case as a struggle between the defendant and the
victim's family and by seeming to erase the role of the state.").
36But see United States v. Mindel, 80 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that victim
lacks standing to challenge district court's order rescinding criminal restitution payments);
United States v. Kelly, 997 F.2d 806, 807 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that victim lacked standing
to appeal denial of request for restitution in criminal proceeding).
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defendant by rehabilitating him. As to the latter purpose, I note in passing that
it is charmingly archaic. One rarely sees punishment styled as rehabilitative
these days. As to the former, it raises a recurring theme-that it is impossible,
or at least unwise, to single out particular individuals and accord them
interests greater than those of the populace. That is, the fact that a particular
member of society had his home vandalized, with all its attendant economic,
emotional, and other costs, gives that individual no greater interest in
collecting the restitution than belongs to any other member of society?' To
the extent he believes his interests diverge from those represented by the
prosecution, or that the prosecution is not zealous enough, he is simply out
of luck.
A similar attitude is reflected in the sequestration cases, which I will
mention briefly? The courts have generally refused to allow witnesses who
are also related to the victims standing to argue that they should not be
sequestered from trial. The courts have held that the purpose of the First
Amendment right to an open trial is to permit the public to view the trial, and
that the fact that victims or relatives are excluded does not defeat this
purpose, since many other members of the public, and the press, are there to
view the trial.39 Although I express no opinion on the merits of the victims'
sequestration argument, I must say that I can understand how infuriating this
sentiment must be. It treats the mother of a girl killed in a bombing as
completely fungible with any member of the public or press. Here again,
there is a deep aversion to singling out particular people and according them
special protections.
Contrast this attitude with the Court's holding in Payne v. Tennessee"
that victim impact statements are constitutional." The Court based its holding
on a view that the particular victim has something unique to. add to the
"See United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788, 795 (2d Cir. 1990) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that particular claimants may have stake in determining allocation of
award among claimants).
3 Sequestration is not strictly a sentencing issue, though it does come up in the context
of victims or survivors who want to attend trial and also give a victim impact statement. See
United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that victims have no
standing to challenge ruling that they cannot give victim impact statement if they attended
trial).
39See id.; see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-80 (1980)
(holding that First Amendment right to attend trial belongs to citizens and media). The
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, which may be asserted solely by the
defendant himself, not by the public. See Gannett v. Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-82 (1979)
(holding that press has no Sixth Amendment right to keep trials public).
40501 U.S. 808 (1991).
41See id. at 827.
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sentencing hearing-a viewpoint that only she can express.4 2 In addition, in
stark contrast to the restitution and sequestration cases, it also based its
holding on the healing properties provided victims if allowed to give victim
impact statements. 3 But here is the true irony: the "right" to give victim
impact testimony is unenforceable by any particular individual. At least
according to the lower courts, no victim has standing to challenge a prosecu-
tor's decision not to permit the testimony.44 Crime victims who are death
penalty opponents have been denied the opportunity to testify at sentencing. 45
Presumably, the prosecutor can also exercise discretion to deny the opportu-
nity to those who do not fit the stock image of the crime victim, or would not
be convincing enough. In short, the right is more accurately described as a
benefit that can be conferred by the prosecutor, at his sole discretion, when
he believes it would advance the prosecution case.
Finally, contrast the above situations with the unsuccessful standing
argument of Gary Gilmore's mother, Bessie Gilmore. In Gilmore v. Utah,46
the Court held that only Gary Gilmore himself had standing to request a stay
of his execution.47 Since he was competent to act on his own behalf, and had
affirmatively asked to be executed, there was no controversy between him
and the State of Utah, and no room for the voice of any other party." The
majority, terminating the stay of execution in a summary ruling despite
serious questions of the constitutionality of Utah's death penalty statute, did
not even consider the possibility that Bessie Gilmore could claim that she
herself would be injured by the unconstitutional execution of her son.49 Of the
42See id. at 823.43See id. at 821-25.44See McVeigh, 106 F.3d at 335.
45See Mosteller, supra note 12, at 1062 (citing A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearings on S.J. Res. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 71-72 (1997) (statement of Marcia A. Kight) (recounting prosecutor's
refusal to permit Marsha Kight, whose child was killed in Oklahoma City bombing, to give
victim impact testimony, on grounds that she opposed death penalty); see also Robison v.
Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant was not entitled to
present evidence that relative of one victim desired that death penalty not be imposed).
46429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
47See id. at 1016.48See id,
49See id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). An injury which, as Justice White pointed out
in dissent, Gary Gilmore had no power to waive through his own acquiescence in the sentence.
See id.
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four dissenters who would have at least considered granting her standing,"
Justice Marshall made the broadest statement. He said:
I believe that the Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of
individuals not to be victims of cruel and unusual punishment, but that it
also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state
authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.51
There are rich ironies here. An opinion like this could, unfortunately,
only be found in a dissent. Indeed, its argument evokes exactly the fear that
drives so much of standing jurisprudence-the fear of the generalized
grievance. If we gave standing to Gary Gilmore's mother, we would have to
give it to everyone and his mother. Whether or not the argument has merit
when it raises the specter of every member of society having standing to
challenge every death sentence, it has no merit when applied to the mother
of the condemned man. Yet the Court is unwilling to make such distinctions.
The most chilling irony, however, is not that the Court cannot distinguish
between Gilmore's mother and a bystander. It is the way the interests are
assigned.
Who has an interest in the imposition of a death sentence? According to
the conventional wisdom described above, just punishment inures to the
benefit of society as a whole. But who has a stake in arguing that a punish-
ment is unjust, and indeed cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment? According to the Court in Gilmore, the controversy over the
constitutionality of his impending execution was solely between Gary
Gilmore and the state.52 If neither cared to pursue it, no one else could either.
Or to put it differently, the prosecution, even as it sought to have Gilmore
unconstitutionally executed, was assumed to be representing society. If the
prosecution did not see the need to challenge the constitutionality of a death
penalty statute (and I would be surprised if one ever has done so), there was
no room in the proceeding for any other member of society to take a different
position.
Of course, to see the connection between Gilmore and the restitution,
sequestration, and victim impact cases may require thinking about victims
differently. It involves accepting that a murderer can be a victim, and the
5 Justice White was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, arguing that
there was no jurisdictional barrier to Bessie Gilmore's suit. See id. Justice Marshall dissented
separately, see id. at 1019, as did Justice Blackmun, who objected to the summary disposition,
see id. at 1020.
5 Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).52See id. at 1016.
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government can victimize. 3 That is, it involves taking additional steps away
from the notion that the government is always the protector of society against
the forces of evil, and that there is therefore no need for the rest of us to make
our voices heard.
B. The Failure to Prosecute
To quickly review the conventional wisdom about the societal interest
in conviction and punishment: It holds that the prosecutor is the people's
representative, who seeks conviction on behalf of the people when justice
demands it. Individual members of society have ceded to the state monopoly
power to keep the peace, to protect their safety, and to arrest, try, and convict
those who violate the criminal laws.
In addition to the dangers of overzealous prosecution, the converse
danger exists-that prosecutors will fail to prosecute at all.54 Who has
standing to complain when the state fails to use its monopoly power to protect
and keep the peace?5" This is a complex topic. There may be all sorts of good
reasons not to prosecute in an individual case, and justice would likely be ill
served by requiring discretionless, across-the-board prosecution of every case
in a given category. However, our system arguably overcompensates for this
difficulty. As I will discuss, the discretion given to prosecutors, thanks to a
host of current doctrines, is virtually unlimited.56 There is room for more
judicial supervision without running the risk of stripping prosecutors of all
their discretion.57.Moreover, some of the problem transcends individual cases,
and implicates system-wide priorities. Sometimes, as in the domestic violence
area, the setting of priorities may violate the equal protection clause. Nor is
53See Bandes, supra note 30, at 1383-88 (discussing stock notions of victims, and
dangers of defining victim too narrowly); Bandes, Empathy, supra note I, at 405-08
(discussing notion of racial coding of victims).
'There is also the danger that the prosecutor will not prosecute strenuously enough. For
purposes of this discussion, I will focus on the complete failure to prosecute.
5 When the police fail to protect, the Court has generally held that the Constitution is not
implicated, since it contains no affirmative duties. See supra note 5.
56See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2, at 626-29
(2d ed. 1992) (noting that though there are reasonably effective controls against unjust
prosecution, there are, as a practical matter, no comparable checks upon discretionary judgment
whether to prosecute one against whom sufficient evidence exists).
57The pending Victims' Rights Amendment specifically exempts suits to compel charging
decisions. See S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). Yet this is an area in which victims are
currently without recourse. As I have suggested throughout, such omissions suggest that the
current victims' rights agenda-at least that which is reflected in legislative efforts-is
completely congruent with the prosecutorial agenda, and goes to every length not to diverge
from or challenge prosecutorial priorities.
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this problem confined to the area of criminal prosecution. The forces that act
to insulate prosecutorial decision making are also at work in civil rights
cases, in which government is itself the wrongdoer.
As discussed earlier, the Court's standing jurisprudence is very clear on
this point. It holds that no individual is injured by a failure of the government
to enforce the laws. 8 In a number of contexts, this principle simply doesn't
seem descriptively accurate. In the Attica uprising, the unprosecuted prison
guards continued to work in the prison, their conduct unchecked. In the
domestic violence cases, violent men would be left in their homes time and
again without even a reprimand, facing the women who had just futilely
called the police.5 ' These sorts of injuries are tangible, distinct, and palpable.
Moreover, there is, in the common understanding, an injury to society at large
when wrongdoing goes unpunished-a loss of specific and general deter-
rence, a symbolic and public failure of the rule of law,6" and (with a nod to
the restitution cases) a loss of the opportunity to rehabilitate. And finally,
when the injury is apparently directed at a constitutionally protected class,
there are additional societal interests at stake-notably our guarantee of the
equal protection of law.
But now let's examine what these rights, interests, and values are up
against. The bottom line is, they are up against the government. Here is a set
of cases in which victims are not with or for the government, but are seeking
their own voice, and even a sort of supervisory role over the prosecution
function. Here is where the big guns get rolled out. As I indicated, to say that
failure to prosecute never causes injury seems simply wrong. It would be
more accurate to understand this "lack of injury" as an amalgam of several
tenets ofjurisprudence: federalism, separation of powers,6' and a third tenet,
which has no easy label.
38See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that citizen lacks
standing to contest policies of prosecuting authority if neither subject to prosecution nor
threatened with prosecution).
39See, e.g., David Kocieniewski & Kevin Flynn, New York Police Lag in Fighting
Domestic Violence by Ojficers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at I (stating that police routinely
ignore, fail to record, and fail to investigate complaints that other officers have physically
abused their spouses).
6 See Roger J. Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law, CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 1989, at 16, 19 (arguing that decision not to prosecute may invade province ofjury and
create public perception of unfairness); see also Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Consider-
ations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not to Be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 63,
75-77 (1984) (arguing that government owes its citizens duty of protection).
6 It is not unusual, although it is controversial, for federalism and separation of powers
considerations to be explicitly or implicitly made part of decisions on standing. See, e.g., Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984) (separation of powers); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-518 (1975) (federalism).
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The sanctity of prosecutorial discretion is one of federalism's articles of
faith. The state's freedom to identify its own priorities, particularly in the
area of criminal law, is widely cited and zealously protected by the courts. It
is protected not only by standing law, but by the doctrine of Younger v.
Harris,62 which prevents the federal courts from enjoining a criminal
63 adbprosecution, and by absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages."4 If a
case survives all of these procedural hurdles, prosecutorial discretion may
still be used as a knock-down argument on the merits. 65
The separation of powers doctrine is the twin jurisdictional argument
against supervision of prosecutors. The fact that prosecution is an executive
rather than a judicial function is often invoked as if this explains why any
particular executive function should be insulated from judicial supervision.
As I mentioned earlier, to some extent the fact-specific nature and many
variables of prosecutorial charging decisions lead to this judicial hands-off
policy. But to some extent, it also follows from the broad definition of
discretion. If everything is discretionary, there can be no judicially cognizable
abuse of discretion. Of course, there is no discretion to violate the Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, even the equal protection cases tend to treat prosecutorial
discretion like a black box, or perhaps more accurately, a Pandora's box. 66
62401 U.S. 37 (1971).
63See id. at 40-41. Whether the doctrine could be invoked to prevent courts from
ordering a criminal prosecution is an interesting question. To the extent Younger is based on
the desire to allow a pending proceeding to run its course, it should not apply to failure-to-
prosecute cases. Likewise, the Younger rationale that the plaintiff can raise a constitutional
claim in the pending proceeding would not apply in a failure to prosecute case. However, the
rationales that state courts should be trusted to make their own decisions, and that federal
courts should not interfere with state criminal priorities, are equally applicable in failure-to-
prosecute cases. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 344-45 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing various possible components of
federalism as ground for deference to state court proceedings).
6'See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993) (holding that prosecutors
acting in course of their role as advocate for state are entitled to protections of absolute
immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976) (holding that state prosecuting
attorney who acted within scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing criminal prosecution
was immune from civil suit). There is an interesting political question here, as well. Federalism,
and the sanctity of the state's prosecutorial function, have been important values of the crime
control model. It may be difficult to reconcile these values with other portions of the victims'
rights agenda.
65See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1996) (erecting high
barriers for gaining discovery on selective racial prosecution claims); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 294-99 (1987) (holding statistical evidence insufficient to show that prosecutors
sought death penalty in racially discriminatory fashion).
'See, for example, McCleskey, in which Justice Powell reasons that society protects lives
through laws against murder, that implementing these laws requires discretion, and that
therefore, the Court would demand exceptionally clear proof before concluding that discretion
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There is another set of variables at work here, albeit deeply sub rosa. In
part, it is the syndrome I discussed above-the fear of the generalized
grievance, and the inability to find a middle ground. The courts that shy away
from challenges by protected groups seem intent on avoiding the very
acknowledgment that subgroups may share interests not shared by society at
large. The unequal treatment of blacks or women is an issue of societal
magnitude. But it is also an issue that forces society to acknowledge separate
group identities and communities of interest.67 Moreover, as Charles
Lawrence, Reva Siegel, and others have explained, it is an issue that forces
courts to acknowledge racism and sexism within the government, and courts
will, consciously or subconsciously, go to great lengths to avoid facing that
knowledge." Such discomfort with the notion of subgroup harm may be a
predicate for portraying that harm as something more widely shared, more
generalized, and therefore nonjusticiable.
For example, in Los Angeles v. Lyons,69 a federal civil rights suit, the
Court was unwilling to recognize that a young, black, male chokehold victim
in Los Angeles might have cognizable future injury from an ongoing practice
of the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") of choking young, black
males at a far greater rate than it did any other group of residents 0 It treated
Lyons's claim for standing as fungible with that of any other Los Angeles
resident, and then not surprisingly found it too speculative that he would be
choked again.7 To decide otherwise would have required the Court to
recognize racism in the LAPD, shared harms and interests among the black
community, and ajudicial duty to supervise the LAPD to ensure that the harm
was checked. Perhaps a finding of injury was simply too costly.
The Lyons case is another illustration that victims and victimizers often
do not fit the neat stereotypes that the crime control agenda might dictate.
had been abused. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
67See MICHAEL C. DAwSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICS 77-84 (1994) (discussing concept of linked fate).68See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 1016, 1034-35 (1988) (criticizing McClesky and other recent cases involving race and
criminal procedure and their inadequacy in addressing unconscious, invidious discrimination);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 387-88 (1987) (arguing that "judicial exploration of the
cultural meaning of governmental actions with racially discriminatory impact is the best way
to discover the unconscious racism of governmental actors"); Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1147-48 (1997) (examining efforts to reform racial and gender status laws
in nineteenth century to understand modern operation of antidiscrimination law).
69461 U.S. 95 (1983).
7 See id. at 100-01.
71See id.
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Adolph Lyons himself was a law-abiding citizen, but too easily marginalized
because of his race. The decision in his case has been a strong and frequently
invoked precedent for insulating governmental wrongdoing, including police
brutality and police corruption,72 from judicial intervention. Many of the
victims are among the most vulnerable members of society, racially,
economically, and geographically marginalized, and unlikely to receive
legislative protection, or, too often, even the constitutional protection to
which they are now entitled.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most cynical conclusion regarding the judicial role in protecting
victims' interests is that, for standing purposes, the only collective interest
cognizable is the government's own definition of its own interests, which it
buttresses when necessary by claiming to represent victims or society as a
whole. There are less cynical conclusions as well. Federalism, separation of
powers, and prosecutorial discretion all play important and legitimate roles,
when properly defined and limited. We can debate what those limits ought to
be. For the purposes of this conference, however, the question is not so much
the judicial role, or even the prosecutorial role, but the role of the victims'
rights movement. I would like to think that the movement will seek to
advance important goals even when they conflict with the crime control
agenda, even (especially) when they challenge comfortable assumptions and
governmental arrogance, and even when the victims they protect are victims
of governmental abuse or others who do not fit the traditional mold.
7See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 65 & n.57 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
use of Lyons by lower courts to prevent judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional
government policies).
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